Secure healthcare messaging
YEL Health Messenger
End-to-end encrypted messaging, encrypted local file storage in native apps, and document scanning directly in the application.
Designed and published by Leonard DV. A familiar messaging experience across authorized computers, tablets and smartphones.
System map
Architecture
The message is encrypted on the sending device, remains encrypted during Matrix transit, and is decrypted on the recipient’s authorized device.
- 01
Sending device
- E2EELocal encryption
- 02
Transit
- MatrixEncrypted message
- 03
Authorized recipient
- E2EEDecryption on the device
Security
Protection, layer by layer
Messaging, files, hosting and access each have their own protections.
ResponsibilityEnd-to-end encrypted messaging
PurposeKeep messages unreadable in transit.
ResponsibilityFiles saved, scanned or added to the personal library in native apps.
PurposeProtect files on the device. An optional local lock uses biometrics or the device code before reopening YEL.
ResponsibilityHosting in an HDS environment managed by OVHcloud.
PurposeCombine the hosting environment with YEL’s own security measures.
ResponsibilityFilter requests to public services before they reach the application.
PurposeAdd a layer of defense against web attacks and automated abuse.
ResponsibilityA TOTP code alongside the password; passkeys on compatible devices.
PurposeStrengthen sign-in. A passkey can use local biometric unlocking without sending biometric data to YEL.
Gallery
Gallery
YEL interface with demonstration data, as shown on the product website.